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Abstract
A quantum encryption scheme (also called private quantum channel, or state randomization pro-
tocol) is a one-time pad for quantum messages. If two parties share a classical random string, one of
them can transmit a quantum state to the other so that an eavesdropper gets little or no information
about the state being transmitted. Perfect encryption schemes leak no information at all about the
message. Approximate encryption schemes leak a non-zero (though small) amount of information
but require a shorter shared random key. Approximate schemes with short keys have been shown to
have a number of applications in quantum cryptography and information theory [8].
This paper provides the first deterministic, polynomial-time constructions of quantum approxi-
mate encryption schemes with short keys. Previous constructions [8] are probabilistic—that is, they
show that if the operators used for encryption are chosen at random, then with high probability the
resulting protocol will be a secure encryption scheme. Moreover, the resulting protocol descriptions
are exponentially long. Our protocols use keys of the same length as (or better length than) the
probabilistic constructions; to encrypt n qubits approximately, one needs n + o(n) bits of shared
key [8], whereas 2n bits of key are necessary for perfect encryption [3].
An additional contribution of this paper is a connection between classical combinatorial deran-
domization and constructions of pseudo-random matrix families in a continuous space.
1 Introduction
A quantum encryption scheme (or private quantum channel, or state randomization protocol) allows
Alice, holding a classical key1, to scramble a quantum state and send it to Bob (via a quantum channel)
so that (1) Bob, given the key, can recover Alice’s state exactly and (2) an adversary Eve who intercepts
the ciphertext learns nothing about the message, as long as she doesn’t know the key.
∗e-mail: ambainis@ias.edu. Supported by NSF grant DMS-0111298.
†e-mail:csail.mit.edu. Supported by Microsoft Fellowship.
1Classical keys are inherently easier to store, distribute and manipulate, since they can be copied. More subtly,
encryption with a shared quantum key is in many ways a dual problem to encryption with a classical key; see [8, 5] for
more discussion.
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classical
ւ key κ ց
ρ → Alice Bob → ρ
ց ր
Eκ(ρ)
ց
Eve → ???
There are two variants of this definition. An encryption scheme is called perfect if Eve learns zero
information from the ciphertext, and approximate if Eve can learn some non-zero amount of information.
A perfect encryption ensures that the distributions (density matrices) of ciphertexts corresponding to
different messages are exactly identical, while an approximate scheme only requires that they be very
close; we give formal definitions further below. In the classical case, both perfect and approximate
encryption require keys of roughly the same length—n bits of key for n bits of message. In the quantum
case, the situation is different.
For perfect encryption, Ambainis et al. [3] showed that 2n bits of key are necessary and sufficient
to encrypt n qubits. The construction consists of applying two classical one-time pads—one in the
“standard” basis {|0〉, |1〉} and another in the “diagonal” basis { 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)}.
Approximate encryption was studied by Hayden et al. [8]. They introduced an additional, useful
relaxation: they show that if the plaintext is not entangled with Eve’s system to begin with, then one
can get approximate quantum encryption using only n+ o(n) bits of key—roughly half as many as are
necessary for perfect encryption. 2 The assumption that Eve’s system is unentangled with the message
is necessary for this result; othwerwise roughly 2n bits are needed, even for approximate encryption.
The assumption holds in the quantum counterpart of the one-time pad situation (one party prepares a
quantum message and sends it to the second party, using the encryption scheme) as long as the message
is not part of a larger cryptographic protocol. The relaxation also has a host of less cryptographic
applications, for example: constructing efficient quantum data hiding schemes in the LOCC (local
operation and classical communication) model; exhibiting “locked” classical correlations in quantum
states [8]; relaxed authentication of quantum states using few bits of key [9]; and transmitting quantum
states over a classical channel using n + o(n) bits of communication, rather than the usual 2n bits
required for quantum teleportation [5].
The previous constructions of approximate encryption schemes with a shorter key are probabilistic.
Specifically, Hayden et al. [8] showed that a random set of 2n+o(n) unitary matrices leads to a good
encryption scheme with high probability (to encrypt, Alice uses the key to choose one of the matrices
from the set and applies the corresponding operator to her input). However, verifying that a particular
set of matrices yields a good encryption scheme is not efficient; even writing down the list of matrices
is prohibitive, since there are exponentially many of them.
This paper presents the first polynomial time constructions of approximate quantum encryption
schemes (to relish the oxymoron: derandomized randomization protocols). The constructions run in
time O(n2) when the message ρ consists of n qubits. That is, given the key and the input message,
Alice can produce the output using O(n2) steps on a quantum computer. The key length we achieve is
slightly better than that of the probabilistic construction of [8]. Our results apply to the trace norm on
matrices; exact results are stated further below.
2The result of [8] highlights an error in the proof of a lower bound on key length of authentication schemes in [4]. The
results of that paper remain essentially correct, but the definition of authentication requires some strengthening, and the
proof of the lower bound is more involved.
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The main tools in our construction are small-bias sets [10] of strings in {0, 1}2n. Such sets have
proved useful in derandomizing algorithms, constructing short PCPs [6] and the encryption of high-
entropy messages [12]. Thus, one of the contributions of this paper is a connection between classical
combinatorial derandomization and constructions of pseudo-random matrix families in a continuous
space. Specifically, we connect Fourier analysis over CZ
2n
2 to Fourier analysis over the matrices C2
n×2n .
This parallels, to some extent, the connection between quantum error-correcting codes over n qubits
and classical codes over GF (4)n.
1.1 Definitions and Previous Work
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic notation of quantum computing (see [11] for
an introduction). Syntactically, an approximate quantum encryption scheme is a set of 2k invertible
operators
{
Eκ|κ ∈ {0, 1}k
}
. The Eκ’s may be unitary, but need not be: it is sufficient that one be able
to recover the input ρ from the output Eκ(ρ), which may live in a larger-dimensional space than ρ.
Each Eκ takes n qubits as input and produces n
′ ≥ n qubits of output. If n′ = n then each operator
Eκ corresponds to a unitary matrix: Eκ(ρ) = UκρU
†
κ.
For an input density matrix3 ρ, the density matrix of the ciphertext from the adversary’s point of
view is:
E(ρ) = Eκ [Eκ(ρ)] = 1
2k
∑
κ∈{0,1}k
Eκ(ρ)
When the scheme is length-preserving, this yields
E(ρ) = 1
2k
∑
κ
UκρU
†
κ
Definition 1. The set of operators {Eκ} is an approximate quantum encryption scheme (state random-
ization scheme) with error ǫ on n qubits if
for all density matrices ρ on n qubits: D(E(ρ), 1
2n′
I) =
∥∥∥∥E(ρ)− 12n′ I
∥∥∥∥
t
r ≤ ǫ. (1)
Here D(·, ·) refers to the trace distance between density matrices. The trace norm of a matrix σ is
the trace of the absolute value of σ (equivalently, the sum of the absolute values of the eigenvalues).
The trace distance between two matrices ρ, σ is
D(ρ, σ) = ‖ρ− σ‖tr = Tr(|ρ− σ|)
This norm plays the same role for quantum states as statistical difference does for probability dis-
tributions: the maximum probability of distinguishing between two quantum states ρ, σ via a single
measurement is
1
2 +
1
4D(ρ, σ).
Hayden et al. [8] actually considered randomization schemes with respect to two norms: the ∞-
norm (“operator norm”) and the trace norm. In this paper, we consider schemes for the trace norm,
though our proofs go through the Frobenius norm. Constructing explicit randomization schemes for the
∞-norm remains an interesting open problem.
3Recall that for a pure state |φ〉, the density matrix ρ is |φ〉〈φ|.
3
Remark 1. This definition of quantum encryption implicitly assumes that the message state ρ is not
entangled with the adversary’s system. Without that assumption the definition above is not sufficient,
and it is not possible to get secure quantum encryption using n(1+o(1)) bits of key (roughly 2n bits are
provably necessary). Thus, this sort of construction is not universally useful in cryptographic contexts,
but nevertheless has many applications (described above).
Previous Work Ambainis et al. [3] considered perfect encryption; this corresponds to the case where
ǫ = 0. The choice of matrix norm is irrelevant there, since E(ρ) = 1
2n′
I. As mentioned above, they
showed that 2n bits of key are necessary and sufficient. The construction uses the key to choose one of
22n Pauli operators (defined below) and applies that to the input state.
Hayden et al. [8] showed that a set of O(n22n/ǫ2) unitary operators suffices (for both the ∞-norm
and the trace norm). For the trace norm, they even showed that a random set of Pauli matrices (see
below) would suffice. This means that for encrypting n qubits, they presented a non-polynomial-time
scheme requiring n+ 2 log n+ 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
+O(1) bits of key.
1.2 Our Results
We present three explicit, polynomial time constructions of approximate state randomization protocols
for the trace norm. All are based on exisiting constructions of δ-biased sets [10, 2, 1], or on families of
sets with small average bias. The three constructions are explained and proven secure in Sections 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3, resepctively.
The first construction is length-preserving, and requires
n+ 2 log n+ 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
+O(1)
bits of key, thus matching the performance of the non-explicit construction. The second construction is
length-doubling: it encodes n qubits into n qubits and 2n classical bits but uses a shorter key: only
n+ 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
bits of key are required. Both of these constructions are quite simple, and are proven secure using the
same Fourier-analytic technique.
The final construction has a more sophisticated proof, but allows for a length-preserving scheme with
slightly better dependence on the number of qubits:
n+min
{
2 log n+ 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
, log n+ 3 log
(
1
ǫ
)}
+O(1)
bits of key. The right-hand term provides a better bound when ǫ > 1n .
More generally, Fourier analysis over the cube {0, 1}n has provided a rich set of tools for understanding
classical boolean functions and distributions on {0, 1}n. We hope the ideas in this paper indicate how
some of the classical results can be transposed to yield new results in quantum information theory.
2 Preliminaries
Small-Bias Spaces The bias of a random variable A in {0, 1}n with respect to a string α ∈ {0, 1}n
is the distance from uniform of the bit α⊙A, where ⊙ refers to the standard dot product on Zn2 :
Aˆ(α) = EA
[
(−1)α⊙A] = 2Pr[α⊙A = 0]− 1.
4
The function Aˆ is the Fourier transform of the probability mass function of the distribution, taken over
the group Zn2 .
The bias of a set S ∈ {0, 1}n with respect to α is simply the bias of the uniform distribution over
that set. A set S is called δ-biased if the absolute value of its bias is at most δ for all α 6= 0n.
Small-bias sets were first considered in derandomization theory by Naor and Naor [10]. Alon, Bruck
et al. (ABNNR, [1]) gave explicit (i.e. deterministic, polynomial-time) constructions of δ-biased sets in
{0, 1}n with size O(n/δ3). Constructions with size O(n2/δ2) were provided by Alon, Goldreich, et al.
(AGHP, [2]). The AGHP construction is better when δ = o(1/n). In both cases, the ith string in a set
can be constructed in roughly n2 time (regardless of δ).
One can sample a random point from a δ-biased space over {0, 1}n using either log n+3 log(1/δ)+O(1)
bits of randomness (using ABNNR) or using 2 log n+ 2 log(1/δ) bits (using AGHP).
Small-bias Set Families One can generalize small bias to families of sets (or random variables) by
requiring that on average, the bias of a random set from the family with respect to every α is low
(Dodis and Smith [7]). Specifically, the expectation of the squared bias must at most δ2. Many results
on δ-biased sets also hold for δ-biased families, which are easier to construct.
Definition 2. A family of random variables (or sets) {Ai}i∈I is δ-biased if
√
Ei←I
[
Aˆi(α)2
]
≤ δ for all α 6= 0n.
Note that this is not equivalent, in general, to requiring that the expected bias be less than δ. There
are two important special cases:
1. If S is a δ-biased set, then {S} is a δ-biased set family with a single member;
2. A family of linear spaces {Ci}i∈I is δ-biased if no particular word is contained in the dual C⊥i of
a random space Ci from the family with high probability. Specifically:
Cˆi(α) =
{
0 if α 6∈ C⊥i
1 if α ∈ C⊥i
Hence a family of codes is δ-biased if and only if Pri←I [α ∈ C⊥i ] ≤ δ2, for every α 6= 0n. Note that
to meet the definition, for linear codes the expected bias must be at most δ2, while for a single
set the bias need only be δ.
One can get a good δ-biased family simply by taking {Ci} to be the set of all linear spaces of
dimension k. The probability that any fixed non-zero vector α lies in the dual of a random space is
exactly δ2 = 2
n−k−1
2n−1 , which is at most 2
−k.
One can save some randomness in the choice of the space using a standard pairwise independence
construction. View {0, 1}n as GF (2n), and let K ⊆ GF (2n) be an additive subgroup of size 2k. For
every non-zero string a, let the space Ca be given by all multiples aκ, where κ ∈ K. The family
{Ca | a ∈ GF (2n), a 6= 0} has the same bias as the set of all linear spaces (δ < 2−k/2), and n bits of
randomness are needed to choose a set in the family.
Entropy of Quantum States As with classical distributions, there are several ways to measure the
entropy of a quantum density matrix. We’ll use the analogue of collision entropy (a.k.a. Renyi entropy).
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For a classical random variable A on {0, 1}n, the collision probability of two independent samples of
X is pc =
∑
a Pr[A = a]
2. The Renyi entropy of A is H2(A) = − log pc.
For a quantum density matrix ρ, the analogous quantity is H2(ρ) = − log Tr(ρ2). If the eigenvalues
of ρ are {px}, then the eigenvalues of ρ2 are
{
p2x
}
, and so Tr(ρ2) is exactly the collision probability of
the distribution obtained by measuring ρ in a basis of eigenvectors.
Fact 2.1. If ρ describes a state in d-dimensional space and Tr(ρ2) ≤ 1d(1 + ǫ2), then D(ρ, 1dI) ≤ ǫ.
Pauli matrices The 2× 2 Pauli matrices are generated by the matrices:
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
The Pauli matrices are the four matrices {I,X,Z,XZ}. These form a basis for the space of all 2× 2
complex matrices. Since XZ = −ZX, and Z2 = X2 = 1, the set generated by X and Z is given by the
Pauli matrices and their opposites: {±I,±X,±Z,±XZ}.
If u and v are n-bit strings, we denote the corresponding tensor product of Pauli matrices by XuZv.
That is, if we write u = (u1, ..., un) and v = (v1, ..., vn), then
XuZv = Xu1Zv1 ⊗ · · · ⊗XunZvn .
(The strings x and z indicate in which positions of the tensor product X and Z appear, respectively.)
The set {XuZv | u, v ∈ {0, 1}n} forms a basis for the 2n × 2n complex matrices. The main facts we will
need are given below:
1. Products of Pauli matrices obey the group structure of {0, 1}2n up to a minus sign. That is,
(XuZv)(XaZb) = (−1)a⊙vXu⊕aZv⊕b.
2. Any pair of Pauli matrices either commutes or anti-commutes. That is,
(XuZv)(XaZb) = (−1)u⊙b+v⊙a(XaZb)(XuZv).
3. The trace of XuZv is 0 if (u, v) 6= 02n (and otherwise it is Tr(I) = 2n).
4. (XuZv)† = ZvXu = (−1)u⊙vXuZv
Pauli matrices and Fourier Analysis The Pauli matrices form a basis for the set of all 2n × 2n
matrices. Given a density matrix ρ, we can write
ρ =
∑
u,v∈{0,1}n
αu,vX
uZv.
This basis is orthonormal with respect to the inner product given by 12nTr(A
†B), where A,B are
square matrices. That is:
1
2nTr((X
uZv)†XaZb) = δa,uδb,v.
Thus, the usual arithmetic of orthogonal bases (and Fourier analysis) applies. One can immediately
deduce certain properties of the coefficients αu,v in the decomposition of a matrix ρ. First, we have a
formula for αu,v:
αu,v =
1
2nTr(Z
vXuρ).
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Second, the squared norm of ρ is given by the squared norm of the coefficients.
1
2nTr(ρ
†ρ) =
∑
u,v
|αu,v|2
Since ρ is a density matrix, it is Hermitian (ρ† = ρ). One can use this fact, and our formula for the
coefficients αu,v, to get a compact formula for the entropy in terms of the decomposition in the Pauli
basis:
Tr(ρ2) =
1
2n
∑
u,v
|Tr(XuZvρ)|2.
3 State Randomization and Approximate Encryption
3.1 Encrypting with a Small-Bias Space
The ideal quantum one-time pad applies a random Pauli matrix to the input [3]. Consider instead a
scheme which first chooses a 2n-bit string from some set with small bias δ (we will set δ later to be
roughly δ = ǫ2−n/2). If the set of strings is B we have:
E(ρ0) = 1|B|
∑
(a,b)∈B
XaZbρ0Z
bXa = Ea,b
[
XaZbρ0Z
bXa
]
That is, we choose the key from the set B, which consists of 2n-bit strings. To encrypt, we view a 2n-bit
string as the concatenation (a, b) of two strings of n bits, and apply the corresponding Pauli matrix.
(The intuition comes from the proof that Cayley graphs based on ǫ-biased spaces are good expanders:
applying a Pauli operator chosen from a δ-biased family of strings to ρ0 will cause all the Fourier
coefficients of ρ0 to be reduced by a factor of δ, which implies that the collision entropy of ρ0 also gets
multiplied by δ. We expand on this intuition below. )
As a first step, we can try to see if a measurement given by a Pauli matrix XuZv can distinguish
the resulting ciphertext from a totally mixed state. More explicitly, we perform a measurement which
projects the ciphertext onto one of the two eigenspaces of the matrix XuZv. We output the correspond-
ing eigenvalue. (All Pauli matrices have two eigenvalues with eigenspaces of equal dimension. The
eigenvalues are always either −1 and 1 or −i and i.)
To see how well a particular Pauli matrix XuZv will do at distinguishing, it is sufficient to compute
|Tr(XuZvE(ρ0))|.
This is exactly the statistical difference between the Pauli measurement’s outcome and a uniform
random choice from the two eigenvalues. We can compute Tr(XuZvE(ρ0)) explicitly:
Tr(XuZvE(ρ0)) = Tr
(
XuZvE(a,b)∈B
[
XaZbρ0Z
vXu
])
= Ea,b
[
Tr(XuZvXaZbρ0Z
bXa)
]
= Ea,b
[
Tr(ZbXaXuZvXaZbρ0)
]
= Ea,b
[
(−1)a⊙v+b⊙u
]
Tr(XuZvρ0)
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Since a ⊙ v + b ⊙ u is linear in the concatenated 2n-bit vector (a, b), we can take advantage of the
small bias of the set B to get a bound:
|Tr(XuZvE(ρ0))| ≤ δ|Tr(XuZvρ0)|
Equivalently: if we express ρ0 in the basis of matrices X
uZv, then each coefficient shrinks by a
factor of at least δ after encryption. We can now bound the distance from the identity by computing
Tr(E(ρ0)2):
Tr(E(ρ0)2) = 1
2n
∑
u,v
|Tr(XuZvE(ρ0))|2 ≤ 1
2n
+
δ2
2n
∑
(u,v)6=02n
|Tr(XuZvρ0)|2 ≤ 1
2n
(1 + δ22nTr(ρ20))
Setting δ =
√
2ǫ2−n/2, we get approximate encryption for all states (since Tr(ρ20) ≤ 1). Using the
constructions of AGHP [2] for small-bias spaces, we get a polynomial-time scheme that uses n+2 logn+
2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
bits of key.
3.2 A Scheme with Shorter Key Length
We can improve the key length of the previous scheme using δ-biased families of sets. The tradeoff is
that the resulting states are longer: the ciphertext consists of n qubits and 2n classical bits. In classical
terms, the encryption algorithm uses additional randomness which is not part of the shared key; in
the quantum computing model, however, that randomness is “free” if one is allowed to discard ancilla
qubits.
Lemma 3.1. If {Ai}i∈I is a family of subsets of {0, 1}2n with average square bias δ2, then the operator
E(ρ0) = Ei∈I
[
|i〉〈i| ⊗ Eab∈Ai
[
XaZbρ0Z
bXa
]]
is an approximate encryption scheme for n qubits with leakage ǫ whenever δ ≤ ǫ2−n/2.
Before proving the lemma, we give an example using the small-bias set family from the preliminaries.
View the key set {0, 1}k as an additive subgroup K of the field F = GF (22n). For every element a ∈ F,
define the set Ca = {aκ|κ ∈ K}. The family Ca has bias δ < 2−k/2. The corresponding encryption
scheme takes a key κ ∈ {0, 1}k ⊆ GF (22n):
E(ρ0;κ) =

 Choose α←R GF (2
2n) \ {0}
Write ακ = (a, b), where a, b ∈ {0, 1}n
Output the classical string α and the quantum state XaZbρ0Z
bXa
With a quantum computer, random bits are not really necessary for choosing α; it is sufficient to
prepare 2n EPR pairs and discard one qubit from each pair. For the scheme to be secure, the bias δ
should be at most
√
ǫ/2n, and so the key only needs to be n+2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
bits long. The main disadvantage
is that the length of the ciphertext has increased by 2n classical bits.
Proof. As before, the proof will use elementary Fourier analysis over the hypercube Z2n2 , and intuition
comes from the proof that Cayley graphs based on ǫ-biased set families are also expanders.
Think of the output of the encryption scheme as a single quantum state consisting of two systems:
the first system is a classical string describing which member of the δ-biased family will be used. The
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second system is the encrypted quantum state. To complete the proof, it is enough to bound the collision
entropy of the entire system by 12n|I|(1 + 2ǫ
2).
For each i ∈ I (that is, for each member of the set family), let ρi denote the encryption of ρ0 with
a random operator from the set Ai. The first step of the proof is to show that the collision entropy of
the entire system is equal to the average collision entropy of the states ρi.
Claim 3.2. Tr(E(ρ0)2) = 1|I|Ei←I
[
Tr(ρ2i )
]
Proof. We can write E(ρ0) = 1|I|
∑
i |i〉〈i| ⊗ ρi. Then we have
Tr(E(ρ0)2) = 1|I|2
∑
i,j Tr
(
(|i〉〈i||j〉〈j|) ⊗ ρiρj
)
Since 〈i||j〉 = δi,j, we get Tr(E(ρ0)2) = 1|I|2
∑
iTr(ρ
2
i ), as desired.
Take any string w = (u, v) ∈ {0, 1}2n, where u, v ∈ {0, 1}n. Recall that Aˆi(u, v) is the ordinary
Fourier coefficient (over Z2n2 ) of the uniform distribution on Ai, that is Aˆi(u, v) = Ea←Ai [(−1)a⊙w].
From the previous proof, we know that
Tr(XuZvρi) = Aˆi(v, u) · Tr(XuZvρ0).
We can compute the now average collision entropy of the states ρi. Using linearity of expectations:
Ei
[
Tr(ρ2i )
]
= Ei

 1
2n +
1
2n
∑
(u,v)6=0
|Tr(XuZvρi)|2


= 12n +
1
2n
∑
(u,v)6=0
Ei
[|Tr(XuZvρi)|2]
= 12n +
1
2n
∑
(u,v)6=0
Ei
[
Aˆi(v, u)
2
]
|Tr(XuZvρ0)|2
The expression Ei
[
Aˆi(v, u)
2
]
is exactly the quantity bounded by the (squared) bias δ2. As in the
previous proof, the entropy Tr(E(ρ0)2) is bounded by 12n|I|(1 + δ22nTr(ρ20)). By our choice of δ, the
entropy is at most 12n|I|(1+ǫ
2), and so E(ρ20) is within trace distance ǫ of the completely mixed state.
3.3 Hybrid Construction
Let d be a prime between 2n and 2n+1. Then, it suffices to show how to randomize a state in a d-
dimensional space Hd spanned by |i〉, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, since a state on n qubits can be embedded
into Hd. We define X and Z on this space by X|j〉 = |(j+1) mod d〉 and Z|j〉 = e2πij/d|j〉. Notice that
XjZk = e2πi(jk)/dZkXj and (XjZk)† = Z−kX−j . (The definitions of X and Z are different than in the
previous sections, since we are operating on a space of prime dimension).
We start with a construction that uses n+1 bits of randomness and achieves approximate encryption
for ǫ = 1. (Notice that this is a non-trivial security guarantee. The trace distance between perfectly
distinguishable states is 2. Distance 1 means that the state cannot be distinguished from Id with success
probability more than 3/4.) We will then extend it to any ǫ > 0, using more randomness.
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Let
E(ρ) = 1
d
d−1∑
a=1
XaZa
2
ρZ−a
2
X−a.
Claim 3.3.
Tr(E(ρ)2) ≤ 1
d
(1 + Tr(ρ2)).
Proof. Let ρ′ = E(ρ).
Tr(ρ′)2 =
∑
ij
ρ′ij(ρ
′
ij)
∗ =
∑
i
ρ′ii(ρ
′
ii)
∗ +
∑
i,j:i 6=j
ρ′ij(ρ
′
ij)
∗.
The first sum is equal to d 1d2 =
1
d because ρ
′
ii =
1
d
∑d
k=1 ρkk =
1
d . To calculate the second sum, we split
it into sums St =
∑
i ρ
′
i,i+t(ρ
′
i,i+t)
∗ for t = 1, 2, . . . , d− 1. (In the indices for ρij and ρ′ij , we use i+ t as
a shortcut for (i+ t) mod d.) We have
ρ′i,i+t =
1
d
d−1∑
a=0
wa
2tρi−a,i−a+t,
where w is the dth root of unity.
ρ′i,i+t(ρ
′
i,i+t)
∗ =
1
d2

d−1∑
a=0
|ρi+a,i+t+a|2 +
∑
a,b,a6=b
w(b
2−a2)tρi−a,i+t−a(ρi−b,i+t−b)∗

 .
Therefore,
St =
1
d
d∑
i=1
|ρi,i+t|2 + 1
d2
∑
i 6=j
ci,jρi,i+t(ρj,j+t)
∗
where
ci,j =
∑
a
w((i+a)
2−(j+a)2)t =
∑
a
w(i
2−j2+2a(i−j))t = w(i
2−j2)t∑
a
wa∗2(i−j)t.
Since d is a prime, 2(i − j)t is not divisible by d. Therefore, ∑a wa∗2(i−j)t = 0, cij = 0, St =
1
d
∑d
i=1 |ρi,i+t|2 and
Tr((ρ′)2) =
1
d
+
1
d
∑
i 6=j
|ρij |2.
By fact 2.1, D(E(ρ), Id) ≤ 1.
We now improve this construction to any ǫ. Let B be an ǫ-biased set on m = ⌈log d⌉ bits. For
b ∈ {0, 1}m, define a unitary transformation Ub as follows. Identify numbers 0, 1, . . . , d− 1 with strings
x ∈ {0, 1}m. Define Ub|x〉 = (−1)b⊙x|x〉, with b⊙ x being the usual (bitwise) inner product of b and x.
(Note that Ub is just to the Z operator over a different group. It is the same Z operator used in the
previous sections). Let
E ′(ρ) =
∑
b∈B
UbρUb and E ′′(ρ) = E(E ′(ρ)).
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We claim that E ′′ is ǫ-approximate encryption scheme. W.l.o.g., assume that ρ is a pure state |ψ〉 =∑
i ci|i〉. Then ρij = cic∗j . Let ρ′ = 1|B|
∑
b∈B UbρU
†
b be the result of encrypting ρ by E ′. Then,
ρ′xy =
1
|B|
∑
b∈B
(−1)b⊙x+b⊙yρxy = 1|B|
∑
b∈B
(−1)b⊙(x+y)ρxy.
Since B is ǫ-biased, |ρ′xy| ≤ ǫ|ρxy| for any x, y, x 6= y. Therefore,
∑
x 6=y |ρ′xy| ≤ ǫ
∑
x 6=y |ρxy|. Together
with Claim 3.3 and fact 2.1, this implies that E ′′ is ǫ-randomizing. The number of key bits used by E ′′
is n + log |B| + O(1) which is n + 2 log n + 2 log 1ǫ if AGHP scheme is used and n + log n + 3 log 1ǫ if
ABNNR is used. The first bound is the same as the one achieved by using small-bias spaces directly
(Section 3.1). The second bound gives a better result (as long as ǫ > 1n).
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